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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, Howard Dean Jones was convicted of attempted strangulation of
his girlfriend, and acquitted of aggravated assault of his girlfriend’s friend. Mr. Jones contends
the prosecutor committed misconduct when he referred in his closing argument to “an hour and a
half break” in the trial, after which defense counsel “had his chance to try to fix” Mr. Jones’
testimony that he did not recall placing his hands on his girlfriend’s neck. The prosecutor’s
comments were factually inaccurate, and insinuated that Mr. Jones and his attorney were
fabricating a defense and committing/suborning perjury. The sole contested issue with respect to
the attempted strangulation charge was whether Mr. Jones possessed the requisite intent to
willfully place his hands on his girlfriend’s throat. The prosecutor did not merely comment on
the evidence, but instead disparaged the defense.

The prosecutor’s comments constitute

misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error, and this Court should vacate Mr. Jones’
conviction and remand for a retrial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Jones was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend, Melissa Umbaugh,
when she returned home from work, and told Mr. Jones she could not recall what she had done
with the rent money. (1/11/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.9-18.) Ms. Umbaugh testified, “He kept wanting to
know where was the money . . . .” (1/10/17 Tr., p.137, Ls.10-13.) Mr. Jones testified he
“wanted to find out what she did with the money.” (1/11/17 Tr., p.76, Ls.6-9.) He testified he
believed Ms. Umbaugh had used the money for drugs. (1/11/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.9-10.) Mr. Jones
admitted that, during the course of the argument, he placed his hands on Ms. Umbaugh’s
shoulders and shook her.

(1/11/17 Tr., p.37, Ls.19-24.)
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He also admitted he pushed

Ms. Umbaugh, and she hit the side of her head on a dresser. (1/11/17 Tr., p.41, L.20 – p.41,
L.2.) Mr. Jones first testified he never placed his hands on Ms. Umbaugh’s neck, but later
testified he realized his hands were on her neck, and then “turned her loose just like that.”
(1/11/17 Tr., p.54, Ls.7-25, p.86, Ls.1-4, p.87, Ls.11-15.) He testified, “I wasn’t trying to choke
her.” (1/11/17 Tr., p.88, Ls.15-18.)
Ms. Umbaugh’s friend and colleague, Lisa Kuba, was living with Ms. Umbaugh and
Mr. Jones at the time of the incident. (1/10/17 Tr., p.167, Ls.9-24.) Ms. Kuba returned home
from work with Ms. Umbaugh, and observed the argument between Mr. Jones and
Ms. Umbaugh. Ms. Umbaugh asked Ms. Kuba to call the police, and Ms. Kuba ran out of the
house and called the police. (1/11/17 Tr., p.39, Ls.13-19.) Ms. Kuba testified she was pushed
out of the house by Mr. Jones, “hit the sidewalk wrong and rolled [her] foot.” (1/10/17 Tr.,
p.171, Ls.7-12.) Mr. Jones denied pushing Ms. Kuba, and said he “was too busy arguing with
Melissa” to run after Ms. Kuba. (1/11/17 Tr., p.73, L.21 – p.74, L.1, p.74, Ls.10-12.) At trial,
defense counsel introduced a statement Ms. Kuba wrote immediately after the incident in which
she did not mention having been pushed by Mr. Jones. (1/10/17 Tr., p.197, Ls.4-8; 1/11/17 Tr.,
p.39, Ls.16-22,) After Mr. Jones was arrested, Ms. Umbaugh took Ms. Kuba to the hospital for
her injured foot, but Ms. Umbaugh did not seek medical help for herself. (1/10/17 Tr., p.148,
Ls.15-25.)
Mr. Jones was charged by Information with attempted strangulation (pertaining to
Ms. Umbaugh) and aggravated battery (pertaining to Ms. Kuba). (R., pp.44-46.) The jury found
Mr. Jones guilty of attempted strangulation, and not guilty of aggravated battery. (R., p.141;
1/11/17 Tr., p.167, Ls.2-8.) The district court sentenced Mr. Jones to a unified term of ten years,
with three years fixed. (3/13/17 Tr., p.252, Ls.16-17.) The judgment was entered on March 13,
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2017, and Mr. Jones filed a timely Notice of Appeal on March 16, 2017. (R., pp.145-50,
151-54.)
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ISSUE
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by insinuating, in his closing argument, that Mr. Jones
and his attorney were fabricating a defense and committing/suborning perjury, and, if so, did this
misconduct constitute fundamental error requiring reversal of Mr. Jones’ conviction?
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ARGUMENT
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Insinuating, In His Closing Argument, That
Mr. Jones And His Attorney Were Fabricating A Defense And Committing/Suborning Perjury,
And This Misconduct Constituted Fundamental Error Requiring Reversal Of Mr. Jones’
Conviction
A.

Introduction
“Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set

forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). Here, Mr. Jones’
unwaived constitutional right to a fair trial was violated when the prosecutor insinuated, in his
closing argument, that Mr. Jones and his attorney were fabricating a defense and committing/
suborning perjury. Among other things, the prosecutor referred to a one-and-a-half hour break in
the proceedings, which consisted of a jury instruction conference and a lunch break, as a chance
for defense counsel to “try to fix” Mr. Jones’ testimony, despite the fact that the defense had
rested prior to the break. The prosecutorial misconduct is plain from the record, and defense
counsel’s failure to object could not have been a tactical decision. The error was not harmless,
as this was a close case, and the only contested issue was whether Mr. Jones possessed the
requisite intent. This Court must vacate Mr. Jones’ conviction and remand for a new trial.

B.

Standard of Review
“When there is no contemporaneous objection a conviction will be reversed for

prosecutorial misconduct only if the conduct is sufficiently egregious so as to result in
fundamental error.” State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007). An error constitutes fundamental
error where it: “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights;
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(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3)
was not harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.

C.

The Prosecutor Violated Mr. Jones’ Unwaived Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By
Committing Misconduct In His Closing Argument, And The Error Plainly Exists
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees the right to a fair

trial in criminal proceedings. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV, § 1. The Idaho Supreme Court
has recognized that “[w]hile our system of criminal justice is adversarial in nature, and the
prosecutor is expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is nevertheless expected and
required to be fair.” State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho
423, 427-28 (1986)). Here, the prosecutor’s closing argument was not fair, and went well
beyond a permissible commentary on the law and the evidence. The prosecutor attempted to
secure a verdict in his favor by disparaging the defense and mischaracterizing a break in the
proceedings as a chance for the defense to “try to fix” Mr. Jones’ testimony. The prosecutor’s
misconduct is plain from the record, and defense counsel could not possibly have made a tactical
decision not to object.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Mr. Jones about whether he placed his
hands on Ms. Umbaugh’s neck during the course of their argument, and Mr. Jones testified as
follows:
Q.

You never placed your hands on her neck, did you?

A.

Nope. I sure didn’t. If I did, it was her shirt—her work shirt against her
neck—

Q.

But you’d never—

A.

—it wasn’t my hands. Nope.
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Q.

You would never put your hands on somebody’s neck, would you?

A.

Nope. I sure haven’t.

(1/11/17 Tr., p.54, Ls.17-25.) The prosecutor continued:
Q.

You would never put your hands on a woman; is that correct?

A.

Not on their neck, no.

Q.

Not on their neck?

A.

No.

Q.

You certainly wouldn’t ever go tell anybody you did that, right?

A.

Yes, I would.

Q.

You would tell somebody you put your hands on somebody?

A.

If I did, yeah, would.

Q.

If you did it, you would?

A.

That’s right.

(1/11/17 Tr., p.55, L.13 – p.56, L.2.) The prosecutor then asked Mr. Jones if he recalled a phone
call he made to his mother from jail. (1/11/17 Tr., p.56, Ls.18-22.) The jury was excused while
the State laid a foundation for admitting the recording of the phone call as substantive evidence.
(1/11/17 Tr., p.58, L.22 – p.59, L.1, p.62, Ls.4-6.) The prosecutor laid the foundation, and the
jury was called back. (1/11/17 Tr., p.71, Ls.5-15.) After more questioning, the district court and
the attorneys left the courtroom to again discuss the recording. (1/11/17 Tr., p.78, L.6 – p.82,
L.21.) The district court then admitted the recording into evidence, and it was played for the
jury. (1/11/17 Tr., p.83, L.18 – p.84, L.21.)
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The prosecutor asked Mr. Jones if he “recall[ed] now telling your mother that you
realized you put your hands on her neck,” and Mr. Jones answered, “Yes, sir.” (1/11/17 Tr.,
p.84, L.23 – p.85, L.2.) Defense counsel questioned Mr. Jones on redirect as follows:
Q.

Okay. How did you put your hands on her neck?

A.

Well, when I had her down on the bed, my hands were sweaty. And when
I was shaking her . . . I reckon my hands slipped and it got her neck. Then
I realized my hands were in the wrong place, that’s when I moved my
hand off of her neck. Because I realized my hand had slipped when I was
shaking her around the neck and I looked and I realized my hand was on
her neck. I turned her loose immediately.

Q.

How long were your hands on her neck?

A.

Not even—as soon as I looked, I noticed my hand was on her neck. I
turned her loose just like that.

(1/11/17 Tr., p.85, Ls.14-25.)

Defense counsel asked Mr. Jones if he applied pressure to

Ms. Umbaugh’s neck, and he answered that when he realized he was applying pressure, he
“turned her loose” and “let her up.” (1/11/17 Tr., p.87, Ls.11-15.) He testified he “wasn’t trying
to choke her.” (1/11/17 Tr., p.88, Ls.15-18.)
After redirect, the defense rested at 11:32 a.m., and the district court instructed the jury it
would take a lunch recess until 1:00 p.m. (R., pp.125-26; 1/11/17 Tr., p.89, Ls.3-20.) When the
jury left for lunch, the parties discussed the final jury instructions on the record until 11:43 a.m.,
and the district court then “recess[ed] for the lunch hour.” (R., pp.125-26.) The proceedings
resumed at 1:04 p.m. with the jury instructions and closing arguments.

(R., p.126.)

No

additional evidence was presented after the one-and-a-half hour lunch break. (See R., p.126.)
In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed Mr. Jones’ testimony that he never put
his hands on a woman’s neck. (1/11/17 Tr., p.110, L.15 – p.111, L.7.) The prosecutor then said:
And then the phone call. You remember that? You remember maybe a little
excitement in the courtroom? You guys had to leave for a little bit. And then you
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heard the call. We will play that in a minute. Where, “Oh, yeah, I told my mom.
I realized. It just dawned on me. My hands were actually on her neck.”
And then Mr. Essma had his chance to try to fix that, after, of course, an hour and
a half break. We introduced the evidence. We break for an hour and a half, what
do you know? Mr. Essma states:
“So how come, Mr. Jones, when I first asked you about this incident, you didn’t
say anything about your hands being on the victim’s neck?”
One, he is not giving you the whole story. And two, his answer does not
corroborate with anything that either of the other witnesses said.
“Oh, I reckon my hands were hot and sweaty from shaking the truth out of her,
and my thumbs just happened to go across her throat for a half second. Not
strong enough to stop her breathing or yelling or anything like that. It was just a
mistake, and as soon as I realized it, I stopped.” Really?
That’s the story they gave you. Now, they don’t have a burden, but he did testify.
And the state is more than welcome to attack his story. That is what it is, a story.
Thought out, after quite painfully, it was pointed out that he was not telling the
truth.
(1/11/17 Tr., p.111, L.8 – p.112, L.16.)
In his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor again disparaged defense counsel. He
stated, in reference to defense counsel’s theory that Ms. Kuba might have accused Mr. Jones of
pushing her because she was concerned about her medical bills:
Well, that’s quite the theory. That’s quite the possibility. In fact, if Mr. Essma
really thought that was the case, why didn’t he simply ask either of the witnesses
that? He didn’t. There is no evidence to support this vague, imaginary
hypothetical that Mr. Essma has posited to you to bite on. It’s his job. He is
suppose[d] to throw out these things that you might think, you know what? That
does give me some doubt.
(1/11/17 Tr., p.150, L.21 – p.152, L.5.)
The prosecutor committed misconduct in making the statements quoted above. The
prosecutor’s reference to the “excitement” in the courtroom about the phone call suggested the
call was new or surprising evidence; it was not. The prosecutor’s reference to defense counsel
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having “his chance to try to fix that, after, of course, an hour and a half break,” is factually
inaccurate and completely misleading. The one-and-a-half hour break occurred after the defense
had rested, and was a break which included the jury conference and lunch. There is absolutely
no indication that defense counsel spent the break trying to “fix” any aspect of Mr. Jones’ case.
The prosecutor also said defense counsel gave the jury “a story” which was “[t]hought out, after
quite painfully, it was pointed out that [Mr. Jones] was not telling the truth.” The prosecutor is
all but accusing Mr. Jones of perjury, and accusing defense counsel of knowingly presenting
false evidence. In rebuttal, the prosecutor continued his attack on defense counsel, stating it is
“his job” to present what was, according to the prosecutor, a “vague, imaginary” story.
As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court, “Closing argument serves to sharpen and
clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. Its purpose is to enlighten
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence.” State v. Moses, 156 Idaho
855, 868 (2014) (citations omitted).

The prosecutor’s comments, quoted above, were not

designed to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. The comments were instead an
attempt to disparage the defense and secure a verdict at the expense of Mr. Jones’ constitutional
right to a fair trial.
In State v. Sheahan, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether the prosecutor
committed misconduct in commenting during closing argument that defense counsel had misled
and lied to the jury. 139 Idaho 267, 281 (2003). The Court found the prosecutor’s comments
were improper, as they “were intended to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or
prejudice against the defendant based upon asserted misconduct of defense counsel.” Id. The
Court held the statements did not rise to the level of fundamental error, however, because the
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prosecutor “was analyzing the credibility of defense counsel’s evidence and the inferences that
defense counsel was making from that evidence.” Id.
There is a critical difference between this case and Sheahan. Here, the prosecutor was
not simply analyzing the credibility of the defense’s evidence and the inferences defense counsel
was making from that evidence. Instead, the prosecutor was insinuating that Mr. Jones and his
attorney were fabricating a defense and committing/suborning perjury.

The prosecutor’s

reference to an hour-and-a-half break in the proceedings is critically important, as the break
could not possibly have presented the defense with an opportunity to “attempt to fix” its case, as
it came after the defense had rested, just prior to the final jury instructions and closing argument.
The prosecutor then accused the defense of presenting “a story” which was “[t]hought out, after
quite painfully, it was pointed out that [Mr. Jones] was not telling the truth.” (1/11/17 Tr., p.111,
L.8 – p.112, L.16.) The prosecutor later told the jury that coming up with a “vague, imaginary
hypothetical” was defense counsel’s job. (1/11/17 Tr., p.150, L.21 – p.152, L.5.) This was not
permissible commentary, and was extremely prejudicial to the defense.
A prosecutor’s duty is more comprehensive than a simple obligation to press for a
conviction. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Berger v. United States:
[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). In this case, the prosecutor struck with foul blows when he insinuated,
in his closing argument, that Mr. Jones and his attorney were fabricating a defense and
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committing/suborning perjury. This violated Mr. Jones’ unwaived constitutional right to a fair
trial and defense counsel’s failure to object could not have been a tactical decision.

D.

This Court Must Vacate Mr. Jones’ Conviction And Remand For A New Trial Because
The Error In This Case Was Not Harmless
This Court must vacate Mr. Jones’ conviction for attempted strangulation and remand

this case to the district court for a new trial on that charge because the prosecutorial misconduct
in this case was egregious and inflammatory, and the prejudice resulting from that misconduct
could not have been remedied by a limiting instruction. See State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,
444 (2015) (“[P]rosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental
error only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent prejudice
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury that the
comments should be disregarded.”) (quoting Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280).
As counsel for Mr. Jones pointed out to the district court, this case “was very close” and
was “hotly contested.” (3/13/17 Tr., p.248, Ls.12-17.) Mr. Jones testified in his defense, and
acknowledged he shook Ms. Umbaugh by her shoulders and pushed her during the course of
their argument. The jury was instructed that, to find Mr. Jones guilty of attempted strangulation,
it had to find the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones willfully and unlawfully
choked and/or attempted to strangle Ms. Umbaugh. (R., p.133.) The jury was further instructed
that an act is done willfully “when done on purpose.” (R., p.136.) There was no direct evidence
that Mr. Jones willfully choked and/or attempted to strangle Ms. Umbaugh. Defense counsel
argued to the jury in closing that Mr. Jones was guilty of domestic battery, but not of attempted
strangulation. (1/11/17 Tr., p.130, L.20 – p.131, L.7.) Counsel argued the recording of the
phone call between Mr. Jones and his mother supported, rather than contradicted, Mr. Jones’
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testimony that he did not intend to place his hands on Ms. Umbaugh’s neck. (1/11/17 Tr., p.140,
Ls.2-16.)
There was also very limited physical evidence that Ms. Umbaugh sustained injuries
consistent with attempted strangulation. The State introduced photographs of Ms. Umbaugh’s
upper body, but they are hardly compelling. (See State’s Exh. 2.) The photographs show
Ms. Umbaugh’s neck (and chest and face and left ear) were red, but there are no visible finger or
hand marks, and there was no expert testimony regarding the cause of the redness.
Ms. Umbaugh did not seek medical help for her injuries, and the State did not present any
evidence that she sustained any injury to her neck beyond the redness. Most importantly, the
limited physical evidence of Ms. Umbaugh’s injuries does not provide any evidence of
Mr. Jones’ intent.
Considering the lack of evidence regarding Mr. Jones’ intent, and considering the fact
that the jury acquitted Mr. Jones of aggravated battery with respect to Ms. Kuba, the prosecutor’s
comments disparaging the defense and mischaracterizing a break in the proceedings as a chance
for the defense to “try to fix” Mr. Jones’ testimony, constituted fundamental error.

The

prosecutor’s comments could have not have been remedied by a limiting instruction because the
prosecutor all but accused the defense of lying, and argued that defense counsel’s job was to
present a vague and imaginary (i.e. false) story to the jury. The prosecutor’s statements here
were far more egregious than those at issue in Sheahan, because they were not grounded in the
evidence. This Court must reverse.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for attempted
strangulation, and remand this case to the district court for a new trial on that charge.
DATED this 12th day of September, 2017.

/s/
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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